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Do state traditions matter? Comparing deliberative
governance initiatives for climate change adaptation in
Dutch corporatism and British pluralism
M. J. Vink, D. Benson, D. Boezeman, H. Cook, A. Dewulf and C. Termeer
ABSTRACT
In the emerging ﬁeld of climate adaptation, deliberative governance initiatives are proposed to yield
better adaptation strategies. However, introducing these network-centred deliberations between
public and private players may contrast with traditions of interest intermediation between state and
society. This paper shows how state traditions affect newly set up deliberative governance initiatives.
Because of the similarities in geographical characteristics and the differences in state tradition we
choose qualitative case studies in Dutch and British water management. Our comparison is two-fold.
First, we compare deliberative governance initiatives in the different state traditions of the
Netherlands and UK. Second, we compare the newly set up deliberative governance initiative to an
existing policy regime mainstreaming climate adaptation in a similar state tradition, in our case the
Netherlands. We ﬁnd that: (1) Deliberative governance initiatives in the (neo-)corporatist state
tradition of the Netherlands yields learning but shows apathy among politically elected decision-
makers compared to deliberative governance initiatives in the pluralist state tradition of the UK
where clearly deﬁned rules and responsibilities yields negotiation and action; (2) A typical corporatist
policy regime mainstreaming climate adaption in a (neo-)corporatist state tradition yields effective
and legitimate policy formation but lacks learning.
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INTRODUCTION
The plurality of problem deﬁnitions or frames employed in
the societal discussion about adaptation to climate change
sparked proposals for more deliberative initiatives of climate
adaptation governance. These horizontal forms of network
centred policy formulation are claimed to do justice to this
plurality in societal frames through deliberations between
public and private players compared to traditional institutio-
nalised state centred decision-making (Hulme ; Rojas
et al. ; Roncoli et al. ; Dryzek ; Manuel-Navar-
rete ; Feldman ). In addition to this normative
standpoint, the openness to societal players and the capacity
to learn over various frames in deliberative governance
initiatives is believed to bring effective and legitimate
adaptation policies (Shackley & Deanwood ; Nelson
et al. ; Tompkins et al. ; Pahl-Wostl ; Dovers
& Hezri ; Vink et al. a, b).
However, even though climate adaptation emerged on
the policy agenda only recently, climate adaptation is not
a standalone issue but is generally dealt with in existing
state centred policy ﬁelds such as ﬂood safety or freshwater
availability. The governance of climate adaptation and its
accommodation of societal frames and vested interests tra-
ditionally depends on how state centred policy making is
organised. Following literature on the role of the state in
society, Adger et al. () have referred to cross national
differences in state-society relations as different ‘social
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contracts’ determining a division of responsibilities, powers
and mutual expectations in climate adaptation. Similarly,
scholars in the ﬁeld of policy sciences have discussed the
crystallisations of long term patterns of ‘intermediation’
between the state and societal interest through institutions
and policy making routines (Schmitter ; Wilson ).
These ‘state traditions’ vary in their institutionalised patterns
of mutual dependencies between society, organised interest
groups and the state, and therefore yield different insti-
tutional arrangements, or ‘policy regimes’ of norms and
interaction patterns (Schmitter ; Dyson ; Wilson
; Koppenjan & Klijn ; Howlett ; Massey &
Huitema ; Biesbroek ). Proposing more deliberative
governance initiatives as uniform ad hoc arrangements for
effectively governing the various societal problem deﬁ-
nitions associated with the emerging issue of climate
adaptation therefore raises questions on how this empiri-
cally ﬁts different state traditions and compares to existing
policy regimes addressing climate adaptation.
While we do not aim to draw generalizable conclusions
as to what causes differences in deliberative governance
initiatives, or aim to add to the well-established body of lit-
erature on state tradition or policy styles, we do take this
literature as an intriguing background to understand pro-
cesses of deliberative governance initiatives in the
emerging ﬁeld of climate adaptation, and what might
explain cross-state differences. Therefore, this paper takes
a qualitative approach to gain an in-depth understanding
of how new deliberative governance initiatives are set up
and how these function in different state traditions. The
paper compares deliberative governance initiatives in
terms of (1) institutional arrangements, (2) players involved,
and (3) deliberative processes. To understand differences
between deliberative governance and traditional policy
making, the paper compares deliberative governance with
existing policy regimes dealing with climate adaptation chal-
lenges in the same state tradition. We focused on water
management in the UK and the Netherlands. Firstly, water
management represents a typical policy ﬁeld in which cli-
mate impacts are expected to materialize and within
which new deliberative governance initiatives proliferate.
Secondly, both countries share geographical characteristics
of lowland coastal areas prone to sea level rise and changing
precipitation patterns, yet have different traditions in state
organisation and water management policy regimes
(Wilson ; Cook ; Kuks ).
The paper poses two questions: (1) How do framing pro-
cesses and player involvement of a deliberative climate
adaptation governance initiative in the Dutch neo-corpora-
tist state tradition compare to framing processes and
player involvement of deliberative climate adaptation gov-
ernance initiatives in the British pluralist state tradition?
(2) How do framing processes and player involvement in
deliberative governance initiatives of climate adaptation
compare to the framing processes and player involvement
in traditional water management policy regimes taking
care of climate adaptation in Dutch neo-corporatism? For
answering these questions the next section of this paper
will elaborate on the conceptual foundations of state tra-
ditions and policy regimes, which we contrast with
scholarly ideas on deliberative governance. We propose
framing theory as cross-cutting for understanding how delib-
erative processes actually play out in different institutional
contexts. After that we describe our methodological
approach, case study selection and how we conducted
ﬁeld research. In our results section we contextualise our
conceptual framework for climate adaptation in the Dutch
and British, context after which we zoom in on three con-
crete climate adaptation governance case studies and draw
conclusions on how both state traditions affect the delibera-
tive governance processes under study.
STATE TRADITIONS, POLICY REGIMES AND
DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES;
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
Institutionalised interest intermediation
Where in continental European history the state gained a
central role as an idea and an institution safeguarding the
nations’ public interest, in the Anglo-Saxon world such as
the UK the state remained relatively underdeveloped in
taking care of this national public interest. Contrary to con-
tinental European tradition, where on a philosophical level
some authors claim the state to be an administrative insti-
tution which is positioned ‘in-between’ the politically
elected government and the governed, policymaking in the
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UK can be understood as the direct execution of parliamen-
tary will. In theory this means that despite heated opposition
a (regional) majority interest can win without interference of
‘a state’ as an institution representing the nations’ ‘collective’
interest (Dyson ). Speciﬁc societal interests might also
compete for policy making power outside of parliament
but through regulated forms of what Schmitter () deﬁnes
as ‘interest intermediation’ between the state and organised
interest groups. Classical policy studies focussing on systems
of interest intermediation highlight the cross national vari-
ations in these systems as different ‘state traditions’ and
distinguish concrete policy regimes of institutions, regu-
lation and underlying organisational values within these
state traditions that more or less correspond with policy
making traditions (Heclo ; Schmitter ; Dyson
; Wilson ; Howlett ). The Dutch tradition in
interest intermediation between the state and society can
be characterised as an institutionalised negotiation process
between a limited number of organised vested interests
and the state, often referred to as (neo)corporatism, or in
Dutch ‘the polder’. In the UK however, the tradition in inter-
est intermediation is referred to as pluralism, showing much
less institutionalised patterns and more room for a wide var-
iety of societal interest groups to compete for a place in the
policy making process outside parliament (Schmitter ;
Wilson ; Visser & Hemerijck ; Prak ; Lijphart
; Prak & Luiten van Zanden ).
Deliberative governance initiatives
Apart from prolonged institutionalized patterns in interest
intermediation discussed as state traditions and policy
regimes, scholars in policy sciences have highlighted an
empirical trend towards less institutionalized practices of
interest intermediation and policy making. Although con-
ceptually still imprecise, these forms of governance can be
characterized processes of deliberations through inter-
organizational networks which come with a withdrawing
state government (Kickert et al. ; Rhodes ; Sabatier
). Contrary to the institutionalized negotiations that
characterize state traditions like corporatism, this form of
governance may be conceptualized as institutionally
‘decentred’, or network centred, in the sense that the insti-
tutional capacity to regulate the process of governing
remains under developed: Policy outcomes are less depen-
dent on a sovereign regulating authority responsible for
decision making, but more on a marked like co-production
of equal players negotiating trough language (Bevir &
Rhodes ; Howlett ). This empirical notion of a
decentred or network approach to policy making correlates
with the deﬁnition of deliberative governance often prescrip-
tively adopted in climate adaptation studies as discussed in
our introduction section. Because these prescribed delibera-
tions go beyond empirically observed genuine trends
towards more ‘decentred’ governance, we choose to focus
on intentionally initiated governance deliberations between
public and private players. We deﬁned these initiatives in
line with Dryzek () as deliberative governance initiatives
that are increasingly employed by governments to involve
society in policy making in different ways than through
democratic elections or institutionalized forms of interest
intermediation. These initiatives often get shape as temporal
policy programmes discussed above, but may also concern
more structural decentralizations of policy execution
toward a wide variety of regional or local public and private
players. In all cases deliberations take place in-between insti-
tutions rather than within. However, not all state traditions
or policy regimes seem to allow for ad hoc deliberative gov-
ernance initiatives. Where pluralist traditions show
similarities with deliberative governance considering a
wide variety of societal players traditionally involved and a
relatively moderate role for the central state, corporatist tra-
ditions show a stronger role of the state, a high degree of
institutionalization, hierarchy and a limited amount of pre-
selected societal players involved.
Mainstreaming or ad hoc deliberation: operationalizing
the climate adaptation policy process
As Biesbroek et al. () has indicated, different govern-
ments have adopted different approaches to govern societal
adaptation to a changing climate. These differences may
become visible through ad hoc deliberative governance
initiatives, but often got shape as extensions of existing pol-
icies or as a new element in existing policy regimes.
Scholars have labelled these extensions as forms of main-
streaming (Smit & Wandel ; Swart & Raes ).
Mainstreaming climate adaptation will leave traditional
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policy regimes and corresponding systems of interest interme-
diation largely unchallenged. Ad hoc deliberative initiatives
however, might contrast with or parallel traditional policy
regimes as it might involve new players, new ad hoc routines
and potentially bypasses existing policy regimes, or has to
feed back into existing regimes for ofﬁcial decision-making.
Understanding tangible differences between policy processes
mainstreamed in existing regimes or initiated as deliberative
governance requires a shift in focus toward the practical
level of players actually interacting in the policy processes.
To allow us to reconstruct the differences in processes of
policy making and corresponding interest intermediation in
different contexts we draw upon the work of Heclo ()
and others (Hall ; Visser & Hemerijck ; Culpepper
) that understand player centred processes as an interplay
of puzzling over what is at stake, and powering over who gets
what position in the policy process. Hoppe () adopted the
idea of policy players puzzling and powering in a more ‘on
the ground’ deﬁnition of policy making through deliberations
with society. According to Hoppe and others the question
who participates in deﬁning or ‘framing’ what is at stake
can be considered central to concrete processes of puzzling
and powering (Schön & Rein ; Hoppe ; Dewulf
; Vink et al. a, b). Frames take shape as short
storylines or metaphors, explicitly or implicitly saying some-
thing about the cause of the problematic reality -what
is- and at the same time take a moral standpoint towards
this reality pointing towards possible solutions -what ought
to be. Accordingly, in policy deliberations in whatever state
tradition, policy regime or deliberative governance initiative,
a frame may function as a puzzling device in deﬁning what
is at stake, but may at the same time help organizing power
by deﬁning the issue at stake and posing a moral standpoint
towards the issue at stake in relation to the other players
and frames involved in the policy process.
METHODOLOGY
Methodological approach
We applied a qualitative constructivist approach in doing
comparative case study research. We did so for gaining
in-depth understanding how processes of deliberative
governance initiatives play out in different state traditions,
and how these processes compare to climate adaptation
mainstreamed in existing policy regimes. Although we are
aware of the limitations of case study research in drawing
general conclusions on cause-effects in policy research, we
follow Flyvbjerg (), Gerring () and Thomas ()
in their assessment of comparative case study research as
a method for gaining understanding of the non-linear in-
depth relations between a wide variety of variables in con-
text. We apply case study research to nuance general
theory and intuitions on deliberative governance initiatives
in the emerging ﬁeld of climate adaptation. To do so we con-
duct two separate comparisons: (1) similar deliberative
governance initiatives in the emerging ﬁeld of climate adap-
tation are compared on the basis of different state traditions
in which they are embedded, and (2) a deliberative govern-
ance initiative in the ﬁeld of climate adaptation is
compared to an existing policy regime that mainstreams cli-
mate adaptation in the same state tradition.
Because the neo-corporatist state tradition is theoretically
most distinct from the open character of deliberative govern-
ance, we took a Dutch deliberative governance initiative of
climate adaptation in regional water management as our
point of departure. For the selection of our second compar-
able deliberative governance case in a different state
tradition we chose a British regional initiative in relation to
water management for its comparable geographical charac-
teristics and its state tradition being different from the
Dutch tradition and more closely related to the limited role
of the state as represented in deliberative governance
(Dryzek ). For our second comparison we once more
took the Dutch deliberative governance initiative as our
point of departure which we this time compared with climate
adaptation taken care of in the existing regional Dutch water
policy regime. With this second comparison we were able to
understand the empirical difference between what we theor-
etically deﬁned as a deliberative governance initiative and
policy making in a traditional policy regime which main-
streams climate adaptation in existing policies.
Case selection
For the ﬁrst comparison we selected two cases which rep-
resent different state traditions but share novel deliberative
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governance initiatives on water management adaptation to
climate. In the case of (neo-)corporatist Netherlands we
selected the governmental initiated multilevel deliberative
governance initiative of the Dutch Delta Programme for
the Ijsselmeer region (DPIJ). We selected this programme
because it represents a rather innovative and unique,
limited institutionalized horizontal deliberative governance
approach in the Dutch (neo-)corporatist context which cor-
responds with what is often proposed in climate adaptation
literature. The initiative materialised in form of a policy pro-
gramme relatively open to any regional societal players
willing to participate. This resulted in representatives of var-
ious governmental sectors and layers, as well as civil society
representatives, stakeholders and political elected decision-
makers deliberating over how climate adaptation should
take place in the lake they all geographically related with
(Delta Programma Ijsselmeergebied ; Ijsselmeergebied
; Vink & Mulligen ; Van Buuren et al. ).
For pluralist UK we selected the deliberative governance
initiative embedded in the Regional Flood and Coastal Com-
mittees (RFCCs) of Anglia in the UK. We selected this
initiative because it represents a novel deliberative govern-
ance approach to climate adaptation in water management
compared to earlier national agency centred policy making
in the same ﬁeld. Contrary to the unique deliberative govern-
ance initiative in the Dutch climate adaptation context, our
British case represents a much wider applied initiative.
Throughout most of the low laying parts of the UK the
RFCCs are characterised by regional and local public and
private players deliberating over how climate adaptation
should take place in water management without national
government taking the lead. This comparison could yield
in-depth understanding of how deliberative governance
initiatives can become institutionalised and how this relates
to the state tradition.
For our second comparison we selected the unique
deliberative governance initiative in the Netherlands dis-
cussed above, which we compared with a traditional water
management policy regime in the Netherlands dealing
with climate adaptation and referred to as ‘Dry feet 2050’.
We selected Dry feet 2050 because it can be classiﬁed as
an archetypal Dutch regional governmental centred pro-
gramme on ﬂood safety issues which mainstreams the
potential impacts of climate change in their ﬂood safety
policies (Boezeman et al. ). The programme is character-
ised by institutionalised decision-making. In line with the
(neo-)corporatist state tradition the provincial authority
takes the lead in this regional programme and water board
authorities follow together with a couple of traditionally
determined preselected organisations representing vested
interests. Deliberations take place through hierarchical insti-
tutionalised decision-making patterns and informal routines.
Data collection and analysis
We collected data during the policy trajectories under study.
For the Dutch cases we conducted research between 2010
and 2013, which overlaps with the programme duration of
DPIJ (2010–2014) and Dry feet 2050 (2010–2014). For the
British case interviews were conducted and document
analysis was done during the same period. Our data con-
sisted of three parts. We used project documents and
textual information on the institutional arrangements of
the projects. We additionally used textual recordings or
notes of project meetings, stakeholder meetings and steering
committee meetings. This was complemented by interviews
with project ofﬁcials and key stakeholders.
To determine how concrete policy processes played out
in (neo-)corporatist compared to pluralist state traditions, or
deliberative governance initiatives compared to existing
policy regimes we describe: (1) the institutional arrange-
ments embedding the policy deliberations – this includes
laws, regulations and ad hoc project rules and responsibil-
ities; (2) the corresponding players involved in the
deliberations – we describe what responsibilities public ofﬁ-
cials and private players have, what roles they play, and
whether and how these change during the process; (3) the
framing processes that follow the previous and characterizes
the deliberations. We discuss problem framing, meaning
how the problem is ofﬁcially framed, how these framings
develop during the interaction processes (Schön & Rein
; Dewulf et al. ; Vink et al. a), and scale fram-
ing, relating to the problem scales different players use
during the process (van Lieshout et al. ) and what the
implications of these framings are for player dependencies
and negotiations.
We started with the theoretically odd case of delibera-
tive governance in the theoretically deﬁned (neo-)
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corporatist state tradition of the Netherlands, which we
compare with a comparable governance arrangement in
British pluralism of the UK. To understand the empirical
difference of what we theoretically deﬁned as deliberative
governance in the Netherlands, we followed our ﬁrst com-
parison with a second comparison with a traditional
policy making regime mainstreaming climate change in its
policies. In both comparisons we used the same indicators
for classifying the deliberative process and the institutional
arrangements. The method of analysis is summarised in
Figure 1.
CONTEXTUALISING DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE
INITIATIVES IN DUTCH AND BRITISH CLIMATE
ADAPTATION
In 2008 a national state committee set climate adaptation
ﬁrmly on the Dutch political agenda. However, no overall
national climate adaptation policy was formulated. Instead,
the committee framed the issue as a central element in exist-
ing water management policy which resulted in a national act
concerning ﬂood safety. Due to the lack of an overall national
climate adaptation policy, climate adaptation gained little
attention in other policy ﬁelds and became primarily a
national water issue (Boezeman et al. ; Vink et al.
a; Biesbroek ). This implied that climate adaptation
was taken care of in the national water management policy
regime. In line with the Dutch (neo-)corporatist tradition
this policy regime shows an institutionalised decision-
making tradition from medieval periods onwards in which
vested interests play a central role through local water
boards. However, with a changing climate emerging on the
policy agenda and some recent high-water events, the
Dutch government not only developed new ﬂood safety legis-
lation but also started deliberative governance initiatives
regionally, which paralleled the (neo-)corporatist policy
regime. Initiatives like Room for the River and more recently
the Dutch Delta Programme for Lake Ijssel reﬂect a tendency
to organise policy formulation and implementation in a more
decentralised open ad-hoc fashion (Dolfing & Snellen ;
Disco ; Koningsveld et al. ; Kuks ; Bourblanc
et al. ; Buuren et al. ; Prak & Luiten van Zanden
; Vink et al. a, b).
Figure 1 | Comparative analysis of deliberations in climate adaptation governance.
6 M. J. Vink et al. | Do state traditions matter? Journal of Water and Climate Change | in press | 2014
Uncorrected Proof
In the UK the emergence of climate adaptation on the
policy agenda resulted in the formulation of a national cli-
mate act, which at a national level went beyond speciﬁc
policy ﬁelds. Contrary to the Dutch context, the act
enhanced a rather managerial approach to climate adap-
tation as a crosscutting regional issue. By formally
decentralizing climate adaptation responsibilities, regional
public and private organizations were assigned to make pol-
icies at their administrative scale. National government only
coordinated their regional activities in various policy ﬁelds
towards nationally set values (Swart & Raes ; Tompkins
et al. ; Boyd et al. ; Massey & Huitema ; Bies-
broek ). This resulted in climate adaptation being
mainstreamed in regional water management policy
making. Corresponding with this pluralist approach, British
ﬂood protection shows a policy tradition where for a long
time local society rather than the state operated as the pri-
mary policy player (Cook , ; Dryzek et al. ;
Pottier et al. ; van Buuren et al. ). Centuries after
the Dutch started to centralise ﬂood management through
state organisations, in 1930 centralisation of tasks began to
occur in England by the establishment of the national
Land Drainage Act. The act involved the establishment of
regional Catchment Boards to provide ﬂood defences and
drainage in certain areas (Cook , ). The creation
of Regional Water Authorities in 1974 led to ﬂood control
tasks becoming shared between these regional entities,
local authorities and internal drainage boards (IBDs)
(Benson et al. a, b). Although pluralist in terms of
the variety of (societal) organisations involved, deliberation
in decision-making became restricted to rather technocratic
regional authorities and IDBs, whose umbrella group, the
Association of Drainage Authorities, was seen as dominated
by land-owner vested interests (Purseglove & Britain ).
This regional governance structure was reformed under
the Water Act 1989, and came in 1996 under the supervi-
sion of the Environment Agency (EA). Regional Flood
Defence Committees (RDFCs) were also created alongside
the centralised EA, comprised of Agency players and local
authority representatives. Despite the often discussed plural-
ist British state tradition, at this point centralised state
control negotiating with vested interests made the water
policy regime actually seem more corporatist than pluralist.
Similar to the Dutch situation, climate change in
combination with high water events in 2007 made the Brit-
ish government reconsider its ﬂood protection policy regime
and proposed elements of deliberative governance.
(DELIBERATIVE) GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE
ADAPTATION IN THREE CASES
Case 1: deliberative governance initiatives in a (neo-)
corporatist state tradition: ‘the Dutch Delta Programme
Ijsselmeer’
The Dutch state committee drafted an advisory report to the
Dutch government in 2008. The report was based on rather
extreme climate scenario’s pointing towards an urgent need
to ‘climate proof’ the low laying Netherlands, accommodat-
ing a majority of its 17 million inhabitants and economic
activities at or below sea level (Delta Commissie ; Boe-
zeman et al. ). With the strong emphasis on climate
change as the main reason for action high on the political
and societal agenda, the framing of the advisory report sup-
ported the committee in legitimizing its drastic
recommendations (Vink et al. a, b). In line with
the Committee’s drastic recommendations the Dutch
government initiated the Delta Programme in 2010.
Institutional arrangement
The Delta programme is coordinated by a special state ofﬁ-
cial (‘Delta Commissioner’) who acts under the
responsibility of the Minister of Public Works and is legiti-
mized by new national legislation; a Delta Act (Delta
Programma ). The Delta Commissioner is to prepare
so-called Delta Decisions to be made by government every
ﬁve years (Delta Programma ). One Delta Decision,
planned for 2015, is whether to raise the water level in the
country’s largest freshwater lake ‘Ijsselmeer’ by 1.5 meter.
The initial plan of raising the lake’s water level was put on
the policy agenda by the Delta Committee aiming for an
enlarged freshwater reservoir anticipating increased future
summer droughts and to a lesser extend increased ﬂood
safety in view of decreasing discharge capacity to the raising
sea level of the adjacent Waddensea. Accordingly, the Delta
Programme contains a sub-programme for the Ijsselmeer
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region (DPIJ), which has been established to prepare the
Delta Decision parallel to constitutional decision-making
structures. The decision could heavily impact on several
waterfront towns with low-lying traditional quays and har-
bours attracting many tourists. However, some nature
reserves also face permanent inundation in case the
intended 1.5 m rise in water level will be sustained, and
some low-lying industrial areas face ﬂooding (Delta
Programma Ijsselmeergebied ).
Anticipating the potential impacts on the region,
regional governments adjacent to the lake organized them-
selves in an ‘Ijsselmeer’-group opposing the initial plans.
After the establishment of DPIJ this Ijsselmeer group was
incorporated in a broad deliberative governance network
of about 300 public and private players initiated by an
administrative ofﬁce established for DPIJ. The administra-
tive ofﬁce was made accountable to a steering committee
consisting of four appointed representatives from all
regional politically elected decision-makers. The DPIJ delib-
erations were presented as a bottom-up governance process
(Delta Programma ). As the deputy director of the DPIJ
explained to over 100 public and private players in one of
the ﬁrst network meetings, ‘climate is changing, the Ijsselm-
eer water system is running into its limits, and we want to
cooperate with you in ﬁnding ways to adapt the water
system’.
Player involvement
During the ﬁrst phases of the programme the stakeholder
meetings were set up by the DPIJ administrative ofﬁce as
knowledge-sharing meetings. Over 300 public and private
players from the Ijsselmeer region were invited to get to
know each other and to share knowledge about their
insights in the lake’s water system. Players concerned
regional administrators, experts, regional politically elected
decision-makers and representatives of societal interest
groups and business. Although the players were given
ample room for discussing, setting agenda’s and taking
part in workshops, the administrative ofﬁce organized
most meetings, sent invitations, and hence operated as a
gatekeeper organization (Bache et al. ; Bache ; Bar-
zilai Nahon ). In the ﬁnal phases the network meetings
were meant to develop preferable long-term strategies for
achieving the Delta Programme goals of a safe and
drought-proof Netherlands (Delta Programma ). Politi-
cal decision-making, however, had to take place in the
constitutional decision-making structures of municipalities,
water boards, provinces and the state.
Initially the sense of urgency with the stakeholders was
rather high, as was the number of participants. Because the
Ijsselmeer region did not exist as an administrative entity in
terms of policy regime prior to the consultation, most public
and private players experienced the ﬁrst network meetings
as novel and valuable in crossing institutional boundaries.
However, during the formulation of plausible strategies,
urgency and participation of various public and private
players gradually faded.
Processes of framing
After the Delta Committee put the Ijsselmeer region on the
policy agenda as a national security issue, the national civil
servants and experts from the DPIJ administrative ofﬁce
reframed the security issue into an ‘upgrading the water
system’ frame, for which in view of a changing climate,
‘doing nothing was not an option’. By setting the boundaries
of the deliberations in form of a technical ‘upgrade’ of a
national scaled interest, the administrative ofﬁce deﬁned
the players who were the plausible holders of relevant
pieces of the puzzle: the mostly national and regional
public administrators directly involved in the technical or
procedural characteristics of the system. In addition, by
framing the issue as a national ‘system’ wittingly or unwit-
tingly, the administrative ofﬁce put technical experts in
charge leaving less room for political elected decision-
makers lacking the technical knowledge to join in solving
a ‘technical puzzle’. Regional political elected decision-
makers struggled with reframing the technically deﬁned
‘system’ issue into a regional scaled societal or political
issue. Repeatedly public and private regional players asked
the DPIJ administrative ofﬁce to be clear about the water
level as preferred by the national government on the
medium-long term, or to be clear about the decision-
making procedures, allowing the societal and political
players to position themselves towards this new proposed
reality. The administrative ofﬁce however, was hesitant in
taking a stand about national preferences or ofﬁcial
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procedures. In line with the technical framing they focused
on the ﬁne-tuning of various plausible strategies covering a
broad range of hypothetical water levels and time lines
(Vink & Mulligen ). Subsequently some political players
failed to see societal and political sense reﬂected in the pro-
cess and indicated they might withdraw from the network
meetings and turn to backchannel lobbying at the national
political level (Vink & Mulligen ).
CONCLUSION
Because the national civil servants became the gatekeeper
and the agenda setter discussions remain technical.
Although regional societal representatives and political
elected decision-makers tried to reframe this into more insti-
tutional or political meanings, the framing in the discussions
remained non-political. For the administrative ofﬁce, fram-
ing the puzzle in a non-political way sidestepped the
danger of political controversy. However, the technical
framing in combination with the administrative ofﬁce not
taking stances yielded ambiguity in national aims and corre-
sponding ambiguity in mutual dependencies. This
discouraged regional societal and political elected
decision-makers from sharing their local societal and econ-
omical concerns and negotiating over these concerns in
the deliberations. This led to a ﬂaw in attention and
occasional withdrawal from the voluntary network
meetings.
Case 2: deliberative governance initiative in British
pluralism: The Anglian regional ﬂood and coastal
committees in the UK
Acting on the Pitt Report in 2008, the British government
introduced the Flood and Water Management Act in 2010,
which gives unitary or county authorities the lead responsi-
bility for managing local ﬂood risks (as Lead Local Flood
Authorities or LLFAs), encouraging local engagement in
ﬂood control in view of climate adaptation, investment
decision-making and ‘stronger partnership working’
(National Audit Office ) In addition, RFCCs were estab-
lished. These RFCCs govern the deliberations between the
EA, and the LLFAs and other relevant players in governing
risks. Twelve RFCCs have been established across England.
For reasons of geographical similarity with Dutch lowland
areas, we will focus only on the Anglian region in eastern
England (Table 1). Covering more than 27,000 km2, it is
comprised of mainly high quality agricultural land extending
across several counties. Although the driest EA region in
terms of rainfall, there are particular issues surrounding
ﬂooding as most of the land is ﬂat and low-lying, with 25%
below sea level (Environment Agency ). The north Nor-
folk and Suffolk coast is also particularly vulnerable to sea
erosion while saline inundation is an ever-present threat to
the Broads; a protected area of waterways popular with tour-
ists. To compound these risks, the region is home to six
million people and has the fastest expanding population in
England and Wales. The region contains three RFCCs: the
Northern, Southern, and Eastern.
Institutional arrangements
Established by the EA under obligations in the 2010 Act, the
RFCC statutory committees provide a lead in deciding ﬂood
control programmes in their region. According to the Gov-
ernment (Gov.uk ), RFCCs are responsible for
producing plans that identify ﬂood and coastal erosion
risks, targeting investments to reduce such risks and provid-
ing a coordinating link between the EA, lead local ﬂood
authorities and other relevant players in governing risks.
The EA must consult with the RFCC on conducting its
ﬂood and coastal management functions, take into account
the committee’s decisions in performing these functions,
obtain the permission of the committee when setting a
Table 1 | Regional committees in the Anglian EA region
EA
region
Regional ﬂood and
coastal committee Player composition (seats)
Anglian Anglian (Northern) 1 independent chair 8 EA expert
appointees 10 local authority
representatives
Anglian (Central) 1 independent chair 6 EA expert
appointees 8 local authority
representatives
Anglian (Eastern) 1 independent chair 8 EA expert
appointees 10 local authority
representatives
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levy and spending funds in the region. Although the majority
of EA ﬂood defence expenditure comes direct from national
government, since 2011 not all schemes are centrally funded
meaning the Agency can seek ‘match’ funding from local
authorities via a Local Levy. Committees also review local
authority ﬂood risk assessments and management strategies
to ensure coordination between the local and regional
levels, and consistency with the national strategy. The EA
still maintained overall national responsibility for managing
river and coastal ﬂooding risks in view of climate change. A
key coordinating mechanism in this respect is the National
Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy
with its focus on adaptation to climate change, and at a
regional level the RFCCs.
Player involvement
While meetings are open to the public, RFCC membership
and input to decision-making is restricted to local auth-
orities and player groups pre-determined by the EA.
Committee chairs typically are independent local experts
appointed by the Secretary of State for Environment (head
of the environment ministry or Defra) or the Welsh Govern-
ment. Committees are comprised of a mixture of
conservation group players, farmer and land owner repre-
sentatives, inland ﬂooding experts, coastal ﬂooding experts
– appointed by the EA – and councillors from local lead
local authorities in the region (Table 1). Player involvement
is therefore not as dominated by vested interests as in Dutch
(neo-)corporatist approaches. That said, this approach is
only relatively recent: the committees are more pluralisti-
cally ‘democratic’ than their previous incarnations
(RFDCs) as they now provide strong input for directly
elected local councillors alongside epistemic players. This
input is particularly important because, as mentioned,
RFCCs raise a levy on local authorities to help fund selected
priority ﬂood management schemes.
Institutional membership type varies slightly between
the three committees in the Anglian region (Table 1). For
example, the Anglian Eastern committee is comprised of a
chairman, eight Agency appointed players, including conser-
vationists, farmers and ﬂooding experts, and local councils
ofﬁcials from the LLFAs (Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk
county councils) plus Southend and Thurrock councils.
Committee meetings are generally convened every three
months and are relatively well attended by committee and
non-committee members. Data is unavailable on how
many members of the public attend the meetings, although
evidence from this region suggests that they are largely
absent.
Processes of framing
Framing of ﬂood management issues by committees is partly
determined by national strategic objectives, central govern-
ment funding and, increasingly, local spending and ﬂood
defence priorities. A visible process of reframing occurred
after the Pitt Review, with the government perceiving
ﬂood governance more in terms of localised stakeholder
input to decision-making and partnership working.
Although this reframing did not alter the scale of regional
governance structures, as the RFCCs replaced the RFDCs,
it did lead to the re-organisation of committees to include
greater local authority participation. This ‘partnership’
frame to both funding and managing ﬂood controls has to
an extent altered local authority roles. Regional priorities
are set by the National Strategy, published in 2011 but
local authorities appear now to have greater inﬂuence
over targeting of investments for their priority projects.
Analysis suggests that local ﬂooding concerns are being
addressed in the committee decision-making. For example,
in the Anglian region the EA has had to consult with the
committee to a greater degree than in the past on its regional
programme and spending, although the partnership
approach was already evident before the institutional
changes. According to the Agency (Environment Agency
), it has been ‘working with stakeholders to build
strong working relationships to ensure a co-ordinated
approach’ in the region. As a result, all ﬁve LLFAs in the
Anglian Eastern Region were able to complete preliminary
ﬂood risk assessments and local ﬂood risk management
strategies – the latter in conjunction with other stakeholders
and the public. These documents will underpin future com-
mittee decision-making in the region. While the post-Pitt era
has therefore witnessed a reframing of the ﬂoods issue
towards a more ‘local’ understanding of the problem in
regional governance structures, there is still an element of
centralised agency control.
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CONCLUSION
Deliberative processes in the RFCCs could be seen as broadly
representative of a pluralist state tradition typically associated
with the UK. The committees involve both state agency,
agency appointed and elected local authority players in
managing ﬂood defences, ensuring some degree of local
democratic representation in decision-making alongside a
legally limited role for the state. However, this form of delib-
eration has not always characterised ﬂood management in
England and Wales where the inﬂuence of central state
players and vested interests has been historicallymore promi-
nent and certainly has strong similaritieswith theDutch (neo-
)corporatist tradition. In addition, the main implementing
player in inland and coastal ﬂood defences is still the EA, pro-
viding an indicator of relative power in decisions taken.
Nevertheless, responsibilities of the local organisations
involved are set by national acts and deliberations show fram-
ings that lead to negotiation and ultimately action.
Case 3: climate adaptation regionally mainstreamed in a
traditional water management policy regime of a (NEO-)
corporatist state tradition: the Netherlands, ‘dry feet
2050’
In early 2011, the Provincial Councils of the Dutch North-
ern provinces Groningen and Drenthe were informed by
their administrators and the geographically corresponding
waterboards Noorderzijlvest and Hunze an Aa’s on a
follow up study of their previous ﬁve yearly regional ﬂood
safety updates. These HOWA studies focused on so called
secondary or regional water barriers which concern smaller
inland water systems, which are mainly rain fed. The update
study was relabelled as DV2050 (Dutch for Dry Feet 2050).
The policy letters formulated four direct reasons for the rela-
belled update. First, the HOWA studies did not deal with the
long term, especially with respect to climate change and soil
subsidence. Second, the Province of Groningen decided in
2005 that it wanted to strive for higher safety norms for
regional water barriers to be 1:300 and 1:1,000. Third, the
models used in the previous studies advanced and provide
water levels that differ from the older models. Fourth, the
regional barriers are to be periodically tested. Following
the strategic provincial environmental plan for 2009–2013
in which climate adaptation was labelled as a central goal,
the problem scope of the project was clearly embedded in
a climate adaptation narrative.
Institutional arrangement
Besides taking up climate change in the existing regional
policy regime, the DV 2050 project differs slightly from pre-
vious HOWA studies with respect to its intentions for
stakeholder participation. The start-up document states that
preselected stakeholders will be involved as early as possible
in order to gain acceptance for the end result and to ﬁnd sol-
utions that are ‘integral’ and ‘innovative’ (Stuurgroep Droge
Voeten  ). The strategy is a direct response to the
experiences with the societal resistance the civil servants
encountered in the previous HOWA studies and succeeding
policy implementation. Despite these reframings towards cli-
mate change and stakeholder participation, the basic
institutional constellation of rules, roles and competencies
of the project remains very close to its predecessor, which
are formalized in a the Water Act (2009) and several
National Government Accords on Water (2003, 2008 and
2011). The participating governments are the same, the pro-
vinces of Groningen and Drenthe and the waterboards
Noorderzijlvest and Hunze and Aa’s, as well as the geo-
graphical problem scope of the project. As a matter of
routine, the steering group consists of decision-makers from
the involved four governments. The steering group makes
political decisions and regularly involves the administrators
of the provinces and water boards (Boezeman et al. ).
Player involvement
The project group of civil servants prepares decisions and
operates with sub-projects for which the vested interests in
region are invited as a matter of routine. These are the
branch organization of farmers LTO, the umbrella organiz-
ations for nature and environmental groups, the
organization of the municipalities and the committee on
soil subsidence and energy related organisations (the area
of concern is the largest gas mining area in the Netherlands,
involving various large infrastructural works and the issue of
soil subsidence due to mining). These organisations are
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labelled as ‘priority stakeholders’. The priority stakeholders
receive the agenda of the project group meetings, may
raise new agenda issues and are welcomed to comment,
which they occasionally do. One sub-project leads the deﬁn-
ing safety norms and two deal with developing adaptation
policies for the water systems of the two water boards.
Those sub-projects initiate studies by knowledge institutes
and consultants for speciﬁc expertise or calculations.
The project group coordinates and sets the precondi-
tions for the adaptation policies studies in consultation
with the priority stakeholders. From the start onwards, the
ambition in DV2050 was to intensify stakeholder interaction
in this project vis-à-vis the earlier HOWA studies. The stake-
holder kick-off event was well-attended, but the sense of
urgency for the problem of the project was low. In part
this was due to a lack of concreteness of showing what the
consequences of climate change were for the water system
or for stakeholders. For another part, the tradition of the
state providing safety for its inhabitants in a rather corpora-
tist manner was effective and non-controversial, and
accordingly the general goal and organisation of the project
was non-disputed (Boezeman et al. ).
In all phases of the project the technical and participa-
tory trajectories are clearly separated. Contrary to the
overall project group organisation where ideas and policy
preferences are formulated, the technical trajectory of the
sub groups is expert-dominated. In these sub-groups the
different packages of policies developed in the project
group are considered by assessing their hydrological, econ-
omic, environmental, cultural heritage, and agricultural
effects, also in view of future climate change. The adminis-
trators then propose the technically best assessed policies
to their parliaments for decision-making. Here, we observe
a classical feature of Dutch (neo-)corporatist policy
making, where experts delineate the substantial playing
ﬁeld in which players may bargain (Halffman ).
Processes of framing
As discussed above, ofﬁcially the DV 2050 project is framed
as a periodic update of the water safety system in view of cli-
mate change. During the process this framing translates in
various problem framings held by various players at various
scales: (1) an update of the hydrological models is the
problem, (2) the new norms as set by the province cause the
problem of living up to these norms, and (3) land use is the
problem. In addition the problem framings translate in insti-
tutional framings, (1) on allocation of responsibility, (2) on
budgets, and (3) on how to inﬂuence decision-making.
What is striking is the rather adversarial character of the inter-
actions of the players in the project group holding these
different frames. Most project group meetings of about 3
hours where characterised by one or more conﬂicts: pro-
blems were discussed but responsibilities and budgets were
often actually negotiated over or temporally set aside if dead-
locks were looming. There was little change in this character
during the three years we followed this project. Discussions
often yielded conﬂict and negotiations. However, no civil ser-
vant or primary stakeholder left the process, and most
meetings yielded (incremental) progress in the formation of
a collective agreement on how to update the water system
in view of climate change. Most interactions of conﬂicting
frames took place as part of a policymaking routine with
clear procedures and were characterised by relatively clear
organisational dependencies and responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
Although various governments and stakeholders are
involved, the policy regime has a rather routinized charac-
ter. Meetings and procedures are clear to players involved
and follow interaction-routines. Player selection for partici-
pation is typically (neo-)corporatist in the sense that
‘priority’ stakeholders are invited to take part in meetings,
are known by governmental players and represent powerful
organised societal interests. The initial regionally scaled pro-
blem framing is contested by other framings in a rather
adversarial manner during regular meetings. However, due
to clearly deﬁned roles, responsibilities and interdependen-
cies, frame differences yield negotiations rather than
apathy or controversy (Boezeman et al. ).
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
The results summarised in Table 2 show clear differences
and similarities between the three cases. In line with
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Howlett () different state traditions show different
policy regimes, which might change over time (Benson
et al. a, b). This might be illustrated by how the Brit-
ish state tradition, which we labelled pluralism, the water
management policy ﬁeld shows a policy regime akin to the
traditional Dutch (neo-)corporatist tradition, where vested
interests negotiate with (central) authority. Corresponding
the scholarly plea for deliberative governance discussed in
Table 2 | Comparing deliberative governance of climate adaptation with traditional policy regimes in different state traditions
Delta Programme Ijsselmeer (Netherlands) Anglian RFCC’s (United Kingdom) Dry feet 2050 (Netherlands)
State tradition (Neo-)corporatism Pluralism (Neo-)corporatism
Institutional
arrangements
Ad hoc deliberative governance of a
wide variety of up to 300
stakeholders coordinated by an ad
hoc administrative ofﬁce and
steering committee
Deliberative governance initiative
institutionalised through national
acts mainstreaming climate
adaptation in local policy
partnerships of the EA with local
authorities
Institutionalised (neo-) corporatist
cooperation of civil servants.
‘Priority’ stakeholders closely
involved through institutionalised
deliberation mainstreaming
climate adaptation at the
administrative level
Players involved Thirty coordinating civil servants,
four appointed decision-makers
representing all regional political
elected bodies in a DPIJ steering
committee, 300 public and private
stakeholders organised in a
network, 100 regional decision-
makers organised through
‘conferences’
One independent appointed chair,
6–8 EA expert appointees, and 10
local authority representatives
Twenty Civil servants, ﬁve ‘priority
stakeholders’ regularly taking part
in project group meetings, four
decision-makers. About 40 other
stakeholders are bi-annually
informed
Process Problem framing: Problem framing: Problem framing:
A national strategic objective
(climate prooﬁng the
Netherlands) reframed as a
technical task of updating lake
Ijsselmeer
After the Pitt Review national
government framed water safety
as a regional climate change
adaptation issue, to be taken care
of regionally, with local
stakeholder input for decision-
making and ‘partnership’ working
Regional ﬂood safety maintenance,
reframed as a long term challenge
of increasing safety in view of a
changing climate
Interaction patterns: Interaction patterns: Interaction patterns:
Various scale and problem frames
existed but the state centred
national technical framing
remained dominant, yielding cross
scale learning but ambiguity about
actual implementation and apathy
among regional decision-makers
and stakeholders struggling with
how to make sense of the national
technical framing in their own
interest
Although the reframing did not alter
the scale of regional governance
structures it did lead to
deliberative processes in the
committees. This ‘partnership’
frame to both funding and
managing ﬂood controls has to an
extent altered local authority roles
Various scale and problem frames
without one dominant framing
yielded negotiations over
problems, institutional
arrangements, strategies and
consensus. Social learning
remained limited to the limited
number of players involved and
remained within the
institutionalised scope of the
project
Dependencies: Dependencies: Dependencies:
Ambiguous dependencies due to ad
hoc institutionalisation, unclear
routines and procedures and
abstract nationally scaled
technical problem framing
National legislation leads to
relatively clear responsibilities of,
and dependencies between
organisations involved. This
generally leads to negotiation and
decision-making in RFCCs
Clear dependencies due to
institutional setting and explicit
frame differences, yielding
negotiation and decision-making
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our introduction, and despite state traditions, the emergence
of climate adaptation as a policy issue has sparked delibera-
tive governance initiatives in both British and Dutch water
management. These initiatives however, show different insti-
tutional arrangements, player involvement and different
frames in the deliberative processes.
Deliberative governance dealing with climate adap-
tation in the Netherlands is unlike the country’s (neo-)
corporatist tradition of an ad hoc and pluralist character
and shows a high degree of puzzling over what is at stake,
and only implicit powering strategies over positions in the
policy process. The initiative shows institutionally decentred
deliberations parallel to constitutional decision-making, yet
not routinized or coordinated by national legislation. The
large amount of public and private players participating on
a voluntary basis with no legal coordination or routines
results in processes of learning among a wider array of
players but lacks negotiation over explicated frame differ-
ences. In that sense deliberative governance initiatives of
climate adaptation in the Dutch (neo-)corporatist tradition
might be expected to show ambiguous understandings of
the climate change issue (Hulme ), limited social cohe-
sion and unclear division of responsibility and therefore
yields apathy among participants (Pidgeon ), or a situ-
ation akin to what Darley & Latane () have labelled a
‘bystander effect’ in social psychology (Vink et al.
forthcoming).
In line with other cross national studies (Benson et al.
a, b) pluralism seems only marginally represented
in the British ﬂood protection policy regime compared to
for example other pluralist state traditions like the US or
Australia. Still, different form corporatist Netherlands
national government has taken a coordinating role through
national legislation to coordinate local agency and to
empower nationally set values in regionally formulated
policy. This might explain why climate adaptation is less a
matter of depoliticized puzzling over possibilities between
a wide array of meagrely deﬁned roles and responsibilities
like in the Dutch DPIJ case, and more a matter of centra-
lised agenda setting and legally enforced mainstreaming of
national values, which leads to regional negotiations with
regional authorities at a the regional RFCC level.
Although state traditions do not show a linear relation
with policy regimes or deliberative governance processes
(Howlett ) and despite limitations of qualitative case
study comparisons, our research does suggest that state tra-
ditions empirically seem to relate to the institutional
arrangements allowing for deliberative governance initiat-
ives. State traditions therefore seem to matter for how
deliberative governance initiatives play out. In Dutch cor-
poratism the traditional pattern of negotiation between
limited vested interests and (central) government is strong,
which might be illustrated by the DV2050 case. The routi-
nized nature of corporatist arrangements with clear role
expectations enable a division of tasks to effectively nego-
tiate and decide over complex problems. However, at the
same time these patterns lack new entrance of players and
ideas and therefore delimit learning. As the case of DPIJ
illustrates, the introduction of ad hoc deliberative govern-
ance parallels these corporatist ﬂavoured policy regimes,
which enables for a wider variety of players and ideas but
leads to ambiguous understandings of rules and responsibil-
ities, extensive puzzling and limited action from politically
elected decision-makers. This suggests that corporatist
state traditions with their institutionalised negotiation pat-
terns do not necessarily enable for ad hoc deliberations as
effective decision making arrangements with a wider variety
of players.
Even though the traditional water management policy
regime in Britain might seem more corporatist than its plur-
alist state tradition would suggest, deliberative governance
initiatives for climate adaptation seem to proﬁt from a
state tradition where plurality is traditionally coordinated
by the state through legislation. Although player involve-
ment remains limited in the British case, responsibilities
and dependencies are clearer due to national legislation
coordinating the process. This leads to RFCCs which,
unlike the Dutch DPIJ, are the primary decision-making
bodies and have to negotiate and decide over (local) priori-
ties in ﬂood protection. Unlike the Dutch DPIJ case national
set values are not implicitly empowered through a technical
framing like an ‘update task’, but are explicitly main-
streamed in the local negotiations through national
legislation, national funding and EA involvement. Despite
methodological limitations of our study, our ﬁndings suggest
that due to the national focus on legally coordinating
regional roles and responsibilities pluralist traditions allow
better for deliberative governance initiatives then corporatist
14 M. J. Vink et al. | Do state traditions matter? Journal of Water and Climate Change | in press | 2014
Uncorrected Proof
traditions, which means that in contrast to scholarly pleas
deliberative governance should not be viewed as a universal
approach to effective climate adaptation. Therefore we pos-
ition our ﬁndings in line with Massey et al. () and
Dupuis & Biesbroek (), suggesting that if speciﬁc
countries are considered best practices for successful cli-
mate adaptation initiatives – such as deliberative
governance – this should be done with care and not without
considering existing practices and country speciﬁc traditions
in policy style.
CONCLUSION
Deliberative governance is often proposed to do justice to
the cross-cutting challenge of climate adaptation. However,
deliberative governance does not necessarily match with
existing state traditions in interest intermediations between
society and the state (Wilson ). To understand how
deliberative governance initiatives in the emerging ﬁeld of
climate adaptation play out in different state traditions we
conducted comparative case study research. We compared
two deliberative governance initiatives for climate adap-
tation in the water sector in: (1) the Dutch (neo-)
corporatist state tradition; and (2) the British pluralist state
tradition. To understand the differences between delibera-
tive governance initiatives for climate adaptation with
traditional water policy regimes mainstreaming climate
adaptation in Dutch water management we conducted a
second case study comparison between (1) the Dutch delib-
erative governance initiative mentioned before and (2) a
traditional Dutch water management policy regime main-
streaming climate adaptation as a new challenge.
Our ﬁrst research questions was: How do framing pro-
cesses and player involvement of a deliberative climate
adaptation governance initiative in the Dutch neo-corpora-
tist state tradition compare to framing processes and
player involvement of deliberative climate adaptation gov-
ernance initiatives in the British pluralist state tradition?
First of all, in line with Howlett’s () ideas on non-
linearity between state traditions and policy regimes we
ﬁnd that climate adaptation governance in the UK shows
less pluralist characteristics as might be expected in a
pluralist tradition. Nevertheless, in deliberative governance
initiatives dependencies are clearer compared to the Dutch
deliberative governance initiatives due to predeﬁned respon-
sibilities and nationally set values explicitly mainstreamed
by British national legislation. British deliberative govern-
ance initiatives therefore yield framing processes that
allow for negotiation and action. In the Dutch deliberative
governance initiative a lack of coordination through
national legislation yields unclear division of responsibil-
ities. Due to unclear roles and a dominant technical
framing set by the coordinating administrators the ad hoc
deliberative governance initiative shows less explicit nego-
tiations. Dependencies and responsibilities between
national government and the relatively wide variety of
regional stakeholders remain ambiguous and regional politi-
cally elected decision-makers experience difﬁculties in
negotiating with the national administration. Together
with the ambiguous understandings of what the climate
issue means, these unclear responsibilities and mutual
dependencies result in what can deﬁned as apathy (Pidgeon
) or what socio-psychologists have labelled a bystander
effect (Darley & Latane ).
Our second research question was: How do framing pro-
cesses and player involvement in deliberative governance
initiatives of climate adaptation compare to the framing pro-
cesses and player involvement in traditional water
management policy regimes taking care of climate adap-
tation in Dutch neo-corporatism? We ﬁnd that the
deliberative governance initiative in a (neo-)corporatist
state tradition yields more extensive puzzling and technical
framing among a relatively wide variety of public and pri-
vate players compared to climate adaptation mainstreamed
in typical (neo-)corporatist policy regimes illustrated by the
DV 2050 case. Secondly, despite uncertain knowledge and
ambiguous understandings associated with climate change
impacts on ﬂood management, the typical corporatist
policy regime of DV 2050 in the (neo-)corporatist tradition
yields relatively clear inter-organisational routines, responsi-
bilities, dependencies, and leads to negotiation frames and
subsequent action compared to the DPIJ case. However,
because of the clear procedures, preselected ‘priority’ stake-
holders and routines of the typical corporatist policy regime,
the approach lacks room for learning (Boezeman et al. ).
Despite limitations to qualitative case study comparisons
these results suggest that state traditions matter in enabling
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for deliberative governance initiatives. Scholarly pleas for
effective climate adaptation through deliberative governance
initiatives should be viewed in light of country speciﬁc
traditions in policy making and interest intermediation.
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